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The Infancy Of A Civil Nation In Belarus. From Allegiance To Citizenship

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FROM ALLEGIANCE TO CITIZENSHIP

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Introduction

In recent years, the Humanitarian Techniques Agency (HTA)¹ has touched the civil education topic several times. For us, this topic's watershed was civil education standards' elaboration², in which we took part under the aegis of the Belarusian Civil Education Association in 2006. Heretofore, we would deal with elaboration of this topic's separate aspects³, while our work on the standards allowed us to cover the entire sphere of civil education. In 2007—2008, we worked on Belarus' civil education concept, developed a set of educational-methodical materials on this topic, and conducted the training of coaches and experts from this sphere. During this work, we have found

¹ The Humanitarian Techniques Agency (HTA) is analysts' and methodologists' informal circle drawn round U. Matskevich in 1994. Until recently, it existed in various organizational forms. Since 2007, it is a project group of the Center for Social Innovations (CSI).

² Matskevich U., Matskevich S., Vadalazhskaya T. Approaches to standards and standardization in informal education // *Adukatar*, 3 (9), 2006. — p. 13—21.

³ See: Krupnik S., Matskevich U. Functional literacy in Belarus' education system, Minsk, 2003; Vadalazhskaya T. Conceptualization about civil affiliation as a tool to study the civil community's self-determination // *Sociological knowledge and social processes in modern Belarusian society*. — Minsk: OOO FUIainform, 2003; and U. Matskevich's and S. Matskevich's other articles.

out theoretical gaps and notions' imprecision, and not only in educational-pedagogic aspects, but also in the very contents of the notions «citizen», «citizenship», and «civicism».

On the one hand, we delve into civil education's topics and problems, thrashing out standards, methods, and contents down to concrete educational techniques. Simultaneously, we face with public opinion's and the theoretical plan's uncertainty concerning the understanding of what the Belarusian nation is⁴. But if there is no established conceptualization about the nation, then it is very difficult to formulate the notion «citizen». While there is no at least minimal consensus in disputes and discussions on who the Belarusians are and what the Belarusian nation is, any understanding of a concrete citizen of Belarus is going to be oppugned.

In the modern scientific and pseudo-scientific humanities concerning Belarus, the topic of national and civil relations, the national and civil identity, perhaps heads the list. Almost all authors have touched this theme. Such close attention can be explained by the fact that the key to the Belarusian nation's mystery can reveal the ways to understand and overcome the national history's dramas and tragedies, and to explain today's events and contradictions. Even though it may look like significant exaggeration, nevertheless it is close to the root of the matter. Of course, it is not the only form in which Belarus can and must be perceived, but without the understanding of the national and civil construction processes' history and modernity, it is very difficult to comprehend the country's current situation.

A topic's popularity *per se* does not mean there are qualitative materials sufficient to help us understand the Belarusian realities. However, we do not say that all works available in this direction are erroneous, and that we offer our, correct version in order to solve this

⁴ Both public opinion and history of the Belarusian nation's development can be presented as catastrophes. See: Matskevich U. National relations' peculiarities against the backdrop of cultural catastrophes // Belorussky Klimat, 4, 1997. — p. 23—27.

question. Far from it, — we talk about another approach to such an object as Belarus and the Belarusian nation. Until now, researchers and thinkers who touched this topic have tried to describe and explain with the help of artistic, scientific, or philosophical means what the Belarusian nation is and why it exists like it does. For this purpose, they have used different theories and concepts, resorting to historical, political, social, and cultural bases, etc. Despite differences in these descriptions and their interpretations, all of them are alike in their desire to provide us with the most correct and exact description.

Our purpose is different. We need such a grasp of Belarus which would be suitable for an active managerial attitude to it. Therefore, it is more important for us not to find out how it was or is in sober fact, but how it is necessary to see Belarus so that it would be possible to understand the actual situation and to act intelligently and efficiently in it. The Belarusian nation's formation and the condition of national consciousness must be presented not as a result of heroic and tragic historical events, not only as a definitively accomplished fact given to us for our creative experience and scientific analysis, but as a dynamic process which could be changed by characterful people. It is necessary to break a spell and rationalize the Belarusian nation's history in order to seize and rule it consciously. One of the major aspects of such work is to develop and implement the concept of civil education in Belarus.

The representations existing today in society do not correlate with a theoretical conceptualization, while the latter suffers from incompleteness. However, in spite of the theoretical crudity and inanity of public opinion's representations about the nation and citizenship, the situation brooks no delay. Belarus' education system and the third sector's organizations need conceptual provision for their work on civil education of children and adults. The problem is that it is necessary to work out civil education's contents and methods at the level of the educational process' implementation, but it is impossible to choose concepts and approaches of a higher order, — i.e. we have to develop a civil education concept while there is no established concept of the Belarusian nation.

This small book's aim is to somehow liquidate conceptual incertitude and to fill theoretical gaps in the civil education concept. Also, we would like to remind readers that it is already the fourth book from Belarus For Beginners series⁵ initiated by the HTA / CSI creative collective. None of these books try to describe in full and understand, completely our country, our young statehood and the whole complexity of problems of Belarus' public life. Still, we try to find themes and problems which are not elaborated enough, and start working on them, hoping that we will manage to draw readers', our and foreign colleagues' and experts' attention to them.

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⁵ This series' previous books are *Communities' Building And Development* (2007), *Organizing Activity Games* (2007), *The Quality And Way Of Life In Belarus: Evolution And Possibilities Of Transformation* (2008).

1. Civil education's challenges

1.1. Civil education's difficulties and lessons

In Belarus, there are many various organizations, both state-run and non-state ones, which deal with civil and political education. Some NGOs declare civil education as their activity's basic direction. However, on closer examination it proves that nobody in Belarus' civil education thinks about the notions «citizen» and «civicism». In the third sector, they think that «civil education» is everything, provided that not official bodies, but NGOs deal with education. The state sector even now still uses the Soviet times' theoretical and ideological directives, frequently reducing civil education down to patriotic or military-patriotic one. In recent years, when we began to deal with problems of civil education, we faced with conceptual problems and difficulties in communication. It was found out that most experts in this sphere simply refuse to connect civil education to the notions «citizen» and «civicism», use in their practice strange snippets of concepts, and flounder in the notions' contents and volume.

E.g. the term «citizen of Belarus» does not come easy at all. It appears that those who use programs and techniques borrowed from Europe and the USA have never thought about the fact that they

work not with abstract citizens, but those of Belarus. Nothing else but their textbooks and manuals say nothing about it. There is not a word there about citizens of Germany, Sweden, or the USA either – therefore, trainers and experts say there is no need in the notion «citizen of Belarus» either. We consider it to be erratic and naïve. Even cosmopolites, i.e. «citizens of the world», are brought up and formed in concrete countries' educational systems out of concrete states' citizens.

The opinion spread among NGOs' trainers that civil education has nothing to do with the state, and civicism – with statehood, seems not less strange to us. Non-governmental (or non-state) organizations believe that education they organize should also be «non-state» to the utmost, ignoring the fact that the notion «citizen» is substantially defined with regard to the notion «state». Different types of states presuppose different types of civicism and establish various systems of civil education. NGOs' trainers, at best, teach human rights, forgetting that human rights are universal and do not depend on citizenship, but citizens' rights in different states are secured differently, and different states' citizens can have their rights and protect them in a different degree, which is defined not by human rights, but rights of the citizen, as well as not only rights, but also duties, and the way citizens in different countries treat their rights and duties. In its turn, this difference in citizens' attitudes to their rights and duties can be explained by differences in civil education's contents and forms in different countries.

These problems can seem just technical difficulties in the education process' organization which can be solved by re-educating trainers and compiling normal programs, but when we immersed in this field of activity, we had to reconsider and analyze anew everything we knew about civicism in Belarus. This analysis' results have shown that the difficulties and absurdities in informal civil education's organization are not epichorial, but all-inclusive. The problems of civil education's contents in modern Belarus are also found in two spaces:

- in the space of public opinion, i.e. in images, settings, and representations about the Belarusian nation, citizenship, and Belarus itself, which are shared by the country's inhabitants;
- in the space of ideas, i.e. in such theoretical elaborations, ideologemas, and projects which reflect intellectual work to form civil education's contents — conceptual representations about Belarus, the nation, citizenship, etc.

Of course, these two spaces are connected with each other. Representations about citizenship, the nation, and the country, the feelings we can find in public opinion, acts, and actions describing civil behavior, are results of civil education. These representations' contents and role models do not appear *in abstracto*. They are based on results of intellectual (philosophical, historical, and analytical) work. In effect, public opinion is nothing but adapted and simplified for «everyday usage» theories of «nation» and «citizenship», which became civil education's contents. On the other hand, intellectual work is impossible without analysis and reflexion of the condition of public opinion concerning these questions. It is also impossible to imagine any work in this area as abstract speculations purified of all settings, values, and beliefs inherent in intellectuals as citizens and representatives of the nation.

However, regardless of this connection, these two spaces differ cardinally from each other. Their structures, organization principles, factors and laws of changes, and types of problems arising in them, are different. In the space of public opinion, the important things are the scope, spread of a basic conceptualization about the citizen of Belarus and Belarusian citizenship; definiteness, clearness, and consistency of their contents (vivid images, clear ideals, precise meanings, etc.); these representations' stability in time, from generation to generation.

The unity, substantial saturation, and stability of representations about the nation and its citizens make it possible to consider a nation to be formed and integral, proving the quality of its civil education.

Even though in reality, it is impossible to find total unanimity and permanence, or an absence of informality and substantial defects, — we, nonetheless, use these criteria as an ideal when we estimate a situation.

Other characteristics are used to measure the space of intellectual formulation of ideas and concepts of the Belarusan nation and Belarusan citizenship. Criteria to estimate the field of intellectual work are characteristics of the contents of theories, concepts, and ideas — their modernity, adequacy to the tasks faced by the nation, citizens, and the country, their depth and completeness, etc. One more side to estimate this space is intellectual communication between various projects, concepts, and ideas. We can only speak about a nation's maturity when one of concepts has indisputable priority and domination, but this authority and domination is «to be won» as a result of sharpest discussions, criticism, and a close dialog. It is here where the basic concepts' really substantial development takes place and the most important and productive ideas crystallize. If this stage is absent, and domination is provided by other mechanisms and factors (political, administrative), then there are questions about the quality of dominating concepts' contents. Without real criticism and communication, it is extremely difficult to expect the suggested ideas' real depth, completeness, modernity, and pithiness.

Here, we have no possibilities to present a full-fledged analysis and criticism of both spaces. Partly, it is because this book's format and its other priority purposes. Partly, it is necessary to admit that the knowledge available today, concerning both public opinion's condition and intellectual elaborations' sphere, is incomplete, fragmentary, and systematized badly. It is the subject of further work. At the same time, here it is important for us to designate these spaces' condition and the problems we see in them.

1.2. Citizenship and civicism in Belarusians' public conscience

Being based on available researches in the field of the Belarusian identity, ethnicity, and citizenship, we can allocate some characteristics of public conscience in this area⁶.

First, it is necessary to mark a high enough degree of the spread and stability of the Belarusians' civil and ethnic self-identification. It means that during independent Belarus' existence, such self-determinations as «a Belarusian» and «a citizen of Belarus» have become habitual, even significant and valuable for the country's inhabitants. In this respect, the picture of Belarus' public opinion is rather homogeneous and steady. Still, it is only one and quite formal side of the problem. The more vital issue is what it means for people to be citizens, how they see their country, nation, its present and future. In this respect, the picture of Belarusian public conscience is more complex and topical.

In collective consciousness of the country's inhabitants, there is a set of representations about Belarus, citizenship, and the nation, which is stable and wide-spread, and has a positive motivational potential. However, its volume, as well as its contents' depth and pithiness, is insignificant. That is, representations shared unequivocally, coherently, and confidently by the majority of the country's population, are undefined, formal, and substantially shallow, i.e. they do not suffice to become a real basis of uniting and developing the nation and the country. It concerns representations about Belarus and the nation, but it is revealed, perhaps, most brightly in the conceptualization about citizenship.

In the current situation, we observe an absence of dominating representations of what the citizen is, and what it means to be the citizen of Belarus. Some people think that citizenship has to do with

⁶ Naumenko L. I., Vadalazhskaya T. V. Ethnic and civil affiliation in perception of modern Belarus' population. — Belarus. Nauka, 2006. — 183 p.

one's birth and residence on the country's territory, others – with the political-legal status and its formal attributes (passports, rights, duties, etc.); for some others, it is first of all their emotional and valuable attachment to their country («to be the citizen» means «to love the native land»); for some other people, the major characteristic is their socio-political activity. The shares of Belarusians who prefer this or that definition are close and comparable with each other. Some tendency in these preferences is traced if various generations are compared. People of advanced age, who spent their childhood and youth during World War II and post-war years, only see citizenship as a territorial belonging and a feeling of attachment to the country. Those of the 1960s (*Khrushchev's Thaw*) demonstrate another understanding of citizenship where there is patriotic romanticism, but at the same time representations about citizenship as a political-legal status (even if it is formal) are already revealed strongly enough. It is the result of legal and democratic ideas' penetration and distribution in Soviet society during the Thaw Period (*Ottepel*).

The following two generations, who grew up during Brezhnev's Period of Stagnation (*Zastoi*), show total eclecticism and variety in their understanding of citizenship. Here, there are no obviously dominating representations. It is necessary to stress that these generations by virtue of their age nowadays have the greatest political, economic, social, and cultural influence – thus, they define in many respects social practice, including the country's basic directions of development.

Young generations are characterized by a prevailing formally-status understanding of citizenship, but not that of emotional and territorial attachment. It is expressed most brightly, and one can say it is fixed yet, by the most junior generation who has grown up during Lukashenko's regime. For them, citizenship is first of all a formal (passport) and legal (rights and duties) status, and almost no feelings of attachment to the country.

Thus, from generation to generation, a qualitative shift in the contents of representations about the civil belonging's essence is

traced. As a whole, it is possible to say that one prevailing representations are replaced by a variety and uncertainty, and then by another, more or less precise conceptualization. The changes' basic line has to do with the country's role and place in understanding citizenship. If senior generations perceive citizenship through their connection with the country, whether it be formal, emotional, or supported by values, then the young generation considers it mainly as an attribute, status, or socio-political practice of a person, not linking it to the concrete country and nation.

This shift is also confirmed by their choice of desirable citizenship, readiness to change it, and attitude to their civil belonging. For young generations, their perception of themselves as citizens has nothing to do with the concrete country and nation – it is considered to be a formal condition for self-realization. As a matter of fact, this new understanding of citizenship has no semantic contents which could create a motivating potential for their realization of themselves as citizens. Here, there is a substantial vacuum.

This shift and substantial emptiness are amplified considerably among people with higher education and those who dwell in cities, especially in the capital. This circumstance proves that this problem has a low potential and prospects to be solved soon. If the most active and educated people lack citizenship's semantic filling, then most probably the past stereotypes' and representations' restoration and reproduction are going to occur.

1.3. Modern utopias and projects for Belarus

Unfortunately, the present state of intellectual work in the sphere of national and civil relations does not allow us to hope that the described problems will be solved soon. These problems first of all have nothing to do with new ideas', meanings', and values' distribution and broadcast, but with the adequate contents' absence. In the field of intellectual elaborations, now there is no material which could be broadcast and distributed, thus filling the substantial vacuum which

accompanies the process of the nation's and national statehood's development. It concerns not only state ideology, but also other alternative intellectual projects⁷. None of them satisfy the need in a contemporary, substantially adequate conceptualization about the nation as a whole, the country and citizens, i.e. such representations which could be not a formal, but real basis to understand and perceive the Belarusian nation and to build actions and conducts according to such an understanding and perception.

As criteria of such adequacy and prospectivity of intellectual projects, we see the following:

- ideas', images' and concepts' orientation on the future, on the development of new forms of social, economic, and political relations. It does not exclude the historical memory, continuity, etc., but the ideas and projects which are grounded completely on the reproduction of ancient, even the best samples, are archaic, impractical, and unpromising for the country;

- correlation and synchronization of Belarus' and the Belarusian nation's development with the basic global socio-cultural and political processes and tendencies. All patterns, concepts, or ideas which exclude these conditions and do not try to immerse Belarus in the universal context, are utopian and have nothing to do with socio-historical practice;

- balance, on the one hand, of the nation's and the country's dynamism, flexibility, and openness for future, new social and political forms, and on the other hand, clearness and definiteness of the basic principles which formulate ideas and concepts, thus creating images of the future. In this balance, it is important that the dynamic and «open» part deals with forms of organization, socio-political structures, connections, and relations, while the rigid and basic part — with valuable settings, ideals, moral and ethic standards, etc.

⁷ An intellectual project is a complete (to a greater or lesser extent) set of representations about Belarus, the Belarusian nation, its essence, historical past, and directions of its development.

These criteria are not linked directly to the developing projects' contents, but they define some frameworks for the contents. In particular, all of them are focused on the European way of thinking. One more criterion which concerns not only elaborations in the field of national and civil relations, but has to do with an estimation of any intellectual products' quality, is pithiness, depth, and presence of new cogitative proposals and elaborations.

We shall briefly describe the intellectual projects which exist right now in Belarus, and which define in this or that way representations about the Belarusian nation and citizenship⁸. Though at once, it is necessary to say that not all of these projects have their conceptualization about Belarusian citizenship.

The official state-run project. This project is presented in full by the Belarusian state's ideology⁹. Its basic time orientation is the present. Proceeding from the actual condition of Belarusian society and its needs which arise here and now, it formulates basic concepts, ideals, and samples. These or those ideas are proved by the following

⁸ The bases to allocate the projects are substantial differences' expressiveness and ideas' maturity within the scope of activity of state-run or public organizations, movements, social or cultural projects, etc. The allocated projects have a various degree of integrity, elaboration, and representation in the Belarusian discourse. Actually, only two first can be called projects. Three more projects are rather philosophical or ideological directions. Nevertheless, taking them into account, we can create a more complete picture of the Belarusian intellectual reality.

⁹ It started to be formed conceptually as ideology in 2003, legitimizing ideologically the modern Belarusian state and main principles of its construction and development. See: About the state of ideological work and measures on its advance. Materials of a permanent seminar of executives of national and local state bodies. — Minsk, Academy of Management under President of the Republic of Belarus, 2003. Basics of ideology of the Belarusian state: Lectures. 2 parts / S. N. Knyazev, S. V. Reshetnikova. — Minsk: Academy of Management under President of the Republic of Belarus. — 2004. — 340 p., and other materials.

words, «the nation has precisely said that...». Conformity with momentary interests and situations is the key and constant component of suggested representations about the Belarusian nation and citizenship. Such conformity makes any substantial philosophical, historical, or sociological work not only unnecessary, but also practically impossible. As a result, the Belarusian state's ideology represents an eclectic *mélange* of the most common, formal, and simultaneously pathos statements, slogans, and general abstract knowledge of the state, political system, nation, and universal conventional values (at the level of rhetoric).

Designed to ensure and serve the actual situation, it did not mean *a priori* any analysis of problems or a search for their solutions. Soviet social science and political economy well-known to its developers became the source of the key components of «the Belarusian state's ideology». One of few waymarks described precisely by the country's management was the continuity of the Soviet system with cosmetic changes and additions needed in order to be immersed in the modern European space where Belarus happens to be geographically. Still, the real problem, i.e. mutual coordination of values and ideas of a democratic lifeway and the totalitarian Soviet regime in one representation about the nation and citizenship, was solved by nobody, if it can be settled at all. Therefore, components of the European understanding of the nation and citizenship were used in this «ideology» as rhetorical figures.

Eclecticism and superficiality of this «ideology» allow the state to keep its necessary flexibility, but such a condition does not satisfy even the orderers of this intellectual product because of its blatant vacuity. Besides, the available set of the Soviet ideological forms and democratic rhetorical figures cannot comply with the fast-changing situation, e.g. the need in building relations with the neighboring states. The definition of Belarus' geopolitical place as «the outpost of the Slavic world» or «a link between the East and the West» does not have any more or less elaborated conceptual and activity-oriented representations about the mechanisms of carrying this mission out.

Even with its absolute substantial and profound flexibility, this «ideology» does not function and practically does not meet any of the criteria we have presented.

Adradžeńnie (Revival) national-democratic project. This is how we call a set of ideas which do not represent a united, logically built system of representations, but which, nonetheless, are identified by their belonging to one general current. In the Belarusian discourse, it is described by the words «Belarusian Adradžeńnie»¹⁰. This «project» is the heir of the late 19th — early 20th centuries' «Belarusian national idea» based on canons of then wide-spread in Central and Eastern Europe ethno-cultural nationalism. However, it was canceled by the Soviet version of the Byelorussian nation's construction. In the late 1980s — 1990s, this project had another bonanza period of its development. After the Soviet Union's débâcle, its ideas were widely accepted in the country's socio-political and cultural life.

This project is of a retrospective character, which is actually reflected in its basic category, i.e. revival. It is shown in its time orientation, basic patterns, ideals, and samples of, first of all, a socio-political character — the restoration of legal and political culture,

¹⁰ Within the bounds of this project, the basic ideas' sources are classics of the late 19th — early 20th centuries' national movement (F. Bahuševič, U. Ihnatoŭski, J. Kupała, etc.), modern historical and ethnographic researchers (M. Jermałovič, A. Maldzis, etc.), and literati and publicists (V. Bykaŭ, U. Karatkievič, S. Dubaviec, etc.) The basic ideologemas are developed and spread by the Skaryna Center, the newspapers Naša Niva and Litaratura i Mastactva, the Krynica magazine, etc. The national-democratic project is formulated most precisely as a complete set of ideas by program documents of the Belarusian People's Front, which also incorporate ideas of an ethno-cultural revival and so-called «Litvanism», i.e. the theory proving that Belarus' real name is «Litva» [«Lithuania» in today's Slav Belarusian], while today's «Lietuva» [«Lithuania» in today's Baltic Lithuanian] is to be historically called Samogitia, and that it was the Russian Empire that invented the term «Belaya Rus» or «Byelorussia» [White Ruthenia, White Russia, or Belarus] in order to justify its occupation of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

social organization, etc., which used to be inherent in the Belarusian nation and state during the previous times, i.e. the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Golden Age) and the Byelorussian People's (Democratic) Republic (existed in 1918; devoured by the Bolsheviks in 1919). The Soviet period is considered to be an interruption of the nation building tradition and its ethno-cultural canon which ought to be restored and continued.

However, neither during the dissident years (1960s — 1980s), nor during the years elapsed since the Republic of Belarus was created, the national revival ideas have not been elaborated practically, conceptually, or theoretically. The ideal Belarus, Belarusian nation, and citizenship in the late 20th — early 21st centuries are thought to be the same as they were in the late 19th — early 20th centuries. This circumstance practically removes this project from the frameworks of modernity and adequacy for today's conditions and tasks. It cannot be an activity guide for the Belarusian nation's development, though its basic images, concepts, and ideas remain strong as for their motivation, inspiration, feeling of pride and patriotism. Archaism of this view on the Belarusian nation does not allow it to build a normal representation about Belarus' geopolitical place because its arguments are based on almost one-century old categories and samples. As a result, it formulates rather a general and declarative conceptualization with no real mechanisms to implement it, e.g. «... to build independent, free Belarus within Europe's geopolitical system ... to cooperate with civilized Europe and to preserve peaceful connections with the East¹¹...»

Recently, its inadequacy for contemporary processes has become obvious to many representatives of this intellectual movement. This understanding has not left yet the limits of absorbing the European discussion about new forms of nations' existence in the modern world.

¹¹ Program of the Conservative-Christian Party — Belarusian People's Front (BPF Party).

The project has a potential of «mobility» and development, but right now there are no real conceptual elaborations.

The **Kryūja (Crivitia) project** can be regarded as one of the Adradžeńnie project's branches. The Crivitia project¹², on the one hand, has its own well-developed and most radical ideas about the Belarusans' origin and their vernacular traditional culture. [Crivitia was the name of the land (till the 13th c.) populated by Kryviės (Crivitians) who together with Dryhaviės and Radzimiės participated in the ethnogeny of the people called Lithuanians in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Byelorussians during the Russian occupation (1772—1991), and now — Belarusans.] On the other hand, it is limited to this very component's development, ignoring social and political questions.

These ideas are means to (self)-criticize «Belarus» as both state (official) and national-democratic samples. This project's basic idea is to reassess the Belarusans' ethnogenesis, to recover the true history of the Belarusian nation's origin, and to restore the real name of the people «called erroneously the Belarusans». In this respect, this project is even more outdated as it is centered on the Belarusian nation's strictly ethno-cultural component, being limited to cultural archeology and anthropology. At the same time, the absence of ready-made, already thought over, and elaborated samples of the nation's political and social organization could become the basis and source of some intellectual work because this project's representatives have such a potential. However, their scarce attempts to work out the Belarusian nation's political and social forms of existence appeal mainly to pre-national or anarchical patterns, without any thoughts of how to

¹² The project develops basically in the scientific-intellectual sphere (history, ethnography, philosophy; from V. Łastoŭski to S. Sańko, A. Dziermant, etc.) and in literature and music (T. Kaškurevič, R. Baradulin, U. Karatkievič, Guda, etc.) Its «ideological» center is the Kryūja Ethno-Cosmology Center and its Druvis magazine.

embed them in the modern world. The only exception is their belief that the Crivitians' age-old heathenism is the most adequate to the contemporary ideas of pluralism. In essence, the Belarusans' self-determination in the world is linked to their final decolonization and disposal of everything «Russian», which can only be achieved by changing the name of the country and ethnicon. The «Crivitian Idea» does not review the notions «nation», «nation-state», and «citizenship».

The liberal-democratic project. This is how we call a set of liberal-democratic ideas which describe Belarus' and its nation's desirable future with the help of the categories of «the modern European nation-state» and advanced civil society as the nation's base. It underlines basically political, legal, and socio-economic aspects. As for its time orientation, it can really be called a project as it is completely focused on the future, i.e. such a state of the Belarusian nation which did not exist before, does not exist now, but which can and must exist in the future. This project's main adherents are the Russian-speaking intelligentsia (intellectuals, politicians, cultural workers) who, on the one hand, do not accept the Adradžeńnie project's ethno-national patterns and, on the other hand, do not embrace the state identity's official version because of its Weltanschauung and value grounds¹³.

Citizenship is considered to be the main henotic idea for the Belarusian nation, while its basic slogan can be formulated as «returning to Europe». The nation's ethno-national model, its pastness and incongruity with the latest European samples are pinpointed, thus distinguishing it essentially from the previous projects. However, some other problems can be found here. In particular, the reputed future is only described from the point of view of life organization

¹³ These ideas are revealed most completely by program documents of the United Civil Party and joint democratic opposition, as well as publications of such authors as A. Gritsanov, G. Minenkov, O. Manaev, A. Suzdaltsev, Y. Polessky, etc.

forms which should be simply transferred on the Belarusian soil. Questions of such «transferring» mechanisms and conceptualization of Belarus' uniqueness, as well as these forms' basic substantial and value filling, are not raised. Besides, even though this project's intellectuals constantly appeal to the European discussion of how to change the essence of citizenship in the modern world — it, nevertheless, not reflected in any researches or elaborations concerning Belarus. In this respect, when there is a question of what «the European Belarus» is to look like, they resort to hackneyed phrases and slogans with no substantial and informative filling.

In toto, irrespective of its perspective orientation and modernity (especially if compared to the previous projects), the liberal-democratic project is not adequate for the nation-building tasks because it is extremely proclamatory and formal.

The postmodernist project. It is an assemblage of intellectual searches for the contemporary Belarusian identity, where modernity is regarded from the positions of postmodernism and postcolonialism¹⁴. Right now, it has the status of metaphors, rather than categories. This project, or more likely intellectual intent, is focused on the conceptualization of the present, Belarus, and the Belarusian nation as it is «here and now». Still, as against the first (official state-run) project which is also grounded on the present, — this project proposes to use other tools to perceive and describe the situation with the help of such categories and concepts as «border zone», «colonization», «Creolism», «other», «crinkle-crinkle», etc., which are actively developed in Western humane studies. These intellectual searches do not have and cannot have pragmatic aspirations and therefore they cannot create any conceptualization of Belarus, Belarusian citizenship,

¹⁴ Among this project's basic authors are I. Bobkova, V. Abushenko, O. Shparaga, and P. Tereshkovich. Its ideas are developed and spread, first of all, by the magazines *Fragments*, *Perekrestki*, and *Pamiž*, as well as seminars conducted by the European Humanities University.

and nation. Here, the question is more likely about the Belarusians' self-determination, but not about Belarus or the Belarusian state. The given direction draws our attention, first of all, because it incorporates a significant mental potential, even though its representatives do their best to escape discussions of social and political forms, basic substantial and value topics.

Thus, in Belarus' intellectual space, there is a manifold of intellectual projects. The majority of them are substantially «mobile», i.e. their concepts can be more or less essentially changed. In some of them, it is caused by their time orientation specificity; in others, it is explained by the fact that they are at their initial stage of development. However, none of separate projects have substantial and adequate answers to the demands of time. Besides, despite the specified variety, the field of intellectual work is not structured and organized in a sufficient measure to overcome the problems. Even now, there is practically no informative communication between the projects, which considerably narrows the potential of a mutual development.

The general state of humanitarian and political knowledge, civil education, and the sphere of public conscience in Belarus makes it necessary for us to start analyzing, criticizing, and elaborating basic underlying concepts and categories of political, cultural, and educational practice which sets and adjusts the sphere of civil relations. The central notion needed to be developed and conceptualized is that of the «citizen of Belarus».

2. The citizen of Belarus: on the path to the notion's construction

2.1 The notion «citizen»: three construction methods

Any civil education is based on a corresponding concept. Depending on this concept's contents, civil education implementing systems differ. In its turn, the basis of any civil education concept is the notion «citizen». This notion is the core of a developed set of representations about the citizen. Not only about a citizen of a concrete country, but in general about the citizen of this or that nation in the modern world, and in this or that part of the world where this country tries to be self-identified. We cannot build the notion «Belarusan citizen», not considering the historical changes which happen to the representation about the citizen and citizenship in the part of the world where Belarus tries to be self-identified, i.e. in modern Europe.

Developing the notions «citizen» and «citizenship», we can use at least three ways. The first, logic way: we design the notion according to the laws of logic, being based on the material of the necessary subject knowledge (legal, political-scientific, historical, sociological, etc.)

The second, genetic or historical way: we do not design a comprehensive notion in its logic completeness and correctness, but stress our attention on the changes and augmentations of the representations about the citizen and citizenship in the past and in the future we try to reach.

The third way can be qualified as a typological method or a method of ideal types (M. Weber). At a first approximation, this method can be described as follows: on the basis of analysis and criticism of an empirical material, we find ideal types which are considered to be generalized schemes or principles, and then these schemes and principles are used to interpret and understand concrete social and activity situations, and to organize and manage systems of activity in these situations. In our case, – to organize civil education. The third way is synthetic; we combine logic (logic designing) with historical changes and augmentations in the understanding of citizenship.

It does not matter which way we choose; we have to understand and realize that a notion is developed and formed in meta-subject domains¹⁵. Basically, the ideal representations about «citizen» and «citizenship» can be developed within the framework of political science or sociology, but real practice in this area needs pedagogical, economic, historical, legal, and other knowledge. Thus, we cannot only work with the categories of specified sciences, their correlation is needed. These meta-subject notions and categories are built originally by methodological and philosophical work, and then they are introduced (subjectified) into separate scientific subjects and disciplines. It changes and develops scientific subjects themselves.

Therefore, here we do not try to be strictly disciplinarian. Being in the sphere of interdisciplinary knowledge, we shall build schemes or

¹⁵ Shchedrovitsky G. P. Methodological remarks to the problem of the term's existence // Lexicology's actual problems. Theses of reports at the Third Linguistic Conference, 3—7 May 1971. V. 1. Novosibirsk: NSU, 1971

ideal types suitable for development and conceptual elaboration of the notion «citizen of Belarus». We also underline the need in subsequent work on philosophical and methodological elaborations' subject development.

2.2. Citizen, citizenship, civicism: a range of the notions' definition

The comprehensive framework or the range to define the notion «citizen» is the sphere of politics. One way or another, the contents of civicism cover a person's possibilities, means, rights, and duties to participate in politics. Resorting to Aristotelian ancient characterization, it is possible to say that the citizen is the one who has possibilities and rights to take part in conducting common causes. It is obvious that different people can have different possibilities and rights, but the contents of the notions «citizen» and «civicism» cover their necessary and sufficient minimum. Thus, defining the citizen in the political sphere, we have to set and define this sphere's borders. Actually, the border is where the citizen's rights to participate in conducting common causes are admitted and where the citizen's possibilities are actually implemented. That is to say, the political sphere's border coincides with the borders of the state (at least, it is fair for a certain historical stage), however the state's borders cannot be understood narrowly, i.e. only in a territorial sense. These borders concern not only the territory, but also the sphere of rights, ethics, and consciousness.

The political sphere's borders conterminous to the state's borders do not close the citizen only inside these borders. The citizen can participate (has such rights and possibilities) in conducting causes outside the state, too. However, in this case the contents of civil participation and civil behavior are changing. Inside the political sphere, i.e. the state, the citizen starts to have relations with other citizens or the state as a whole on his/her own behalf, being an independent and autonomous subject of politics. While outside the

state, he/she acts as a representative of this state with specially stipulated rights and powers, i.e. he/she is no longer an independent and autonomous subject of politics.

Before civil society appeared, the state (with all varieties of its forms) remained practically the only way of organizing civilized society. None of non-state institutions (e.g. Church, university, craft guilds, or merchant guilds) distributed their influence on whole society — au contraire, they were exposed to nationalization. The alternative to the state was only traditional societies which did not reach the stage of statehood.

Since the age of Enlightenment (2nd half of the 18th c.), the state also starts to be limited inside its territorial borders. Civil society independent from the state appears and strengthens, and the sphere of private life ripens near the public, communal, societal, and social sphere¹⁶. Civil society and the consciously strengthened sphere of private life are limiting the state from within. Since that, we have to talk not only about the citizen's rights and duties, but also human rights which do not allow the state and politics to interfere with

¹⁶ Here, there is a methodological and theoretical problem: is it possible to talk about the existence of independent private life before the age of Enlightenment? It could become a theme of a separate philosophical-sociological research; we shall only formulate our today's position. Before the age of Enlightenment, it is possible to speak about everyday life and humdrum, families' autonomy and the presence of special features of women's and children's life, but not about any independent private life. The private life sphere as such did not exist because this part of people's life was seen by a whole commune, community, or city, and was also strictly regulated by customs and even social institutions, e.g. Church. One may only recall conditionally some private life during that epoch in the context of minor displays of private initiative and freedom inside families where families' heads ruled, and whose social status guaranteed them non-interference on the part of a commune, state, or Church in the zone of their responsibility.

private lives. Human rights do not cancel and do not supersede the citizen's rights and duties; they are attached to civil rights and coexist with them in a complex set.

During previous historical epochs, individual human life was regulated more likely by ethics, moral, empathy, and national customs. Civil rights' deprivation used to make a person practically undefended from a legal point of view, leaving him/her to the mercy of national customs. The age of Enlightenment and the following centuries have narrowed and limited the political sphere, expanding the sphere of private life and non-political public relations. Still, at the same time during the age of Enlightenment, there was no rigid border between political and private lives; these two spheres developed and formed, synchronously influencing each other. The private life sphere would lose its randomness and become more humane, while the political sphere in its turn would also gain humanistic and moral contents. It does not mean that politics stopped being pragmatic and formal; it means that with the lapse of time politics had to take into account more and more moral arguments and to be guided by reasons of humanism. We can still say it, even remembering the greatest crimes of the 20th century's totalitarian regimes. None point of view can approve the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and fascist Germany and consider them moral and humane. Certainly, they and their industry of death, genocide, and neglect of private individual life drop obviously out of the long-term historical tendency. However, there is still a common trend of the latest two-three centuries. It had been working before these regimes appeared and is still working after they fell.

The political sphere is touched or influenced not only by moral and humanism, but also other spheres, e.g. sciences and knowledge. In its turn, politics influences them as well. Our task is not to consider and analyze all mutual relations and interferences, but we cannot leave the aspects where the political sphere cooperates with other spheres in defining and regulating the citizen's rights and freedoms.

Not leaping ahead in our reasoning, we shall consider an interaction of politics and knowledge in terms of the history of developing and spreading the modern type of citizenship. In history, nothing appears being ready-made out of the blue. Even something which is perceived as something self-evident, simple, clear, and fundamental, had seen the times when it had to fight for its right to exist against something else which also seemed self-evident, simple, clear, and fundamental. Thus in the 18th century, modern representations about the citizen, citizenship, civil rights and freedoms started to be established, but they did not concern women, representatives of color races, and many other people. The whole history of new representations was defined by an opposition between the citizen's rights and human rights.

The age of Enlightenment inherited some elements of democracy from precedent historical formations. In particular, municipal government which subsequently became the pattern to build national states which appeared as a result of the 18th century's great revolutions, first of all, American and French ones. Still, even after these revolutions, electoral rights which are thought today to be fundamental and inviolable, was not given to everybody, but only to a very small part of the population.

In a sense, electoral rights (rights to elect representatives in authority) can be considered the citizen's most fundamental right, but originally it was limited by plenty of exceptions, conventionalities, and qualification requirements. It was not given to women, children, people without their own houses (residential qualification) or property in general (property qualification), as well as illiterates, criminals, etc. It turns out that actually citizens are only a minor part of the nation. Even though in revolutionary France, people used to address to each other with the word «citizen» instead of «monsieur», this fashion was spurred more likely by the dream of equality rather than the real equality. Every adult man in Europe of that time knew and understood how he could get civil rights. It was only necessary for him to get some property, to pay taxes, to find

permanent dwelling, to become a settled member of any local community, and to be literate. However, a woman, even if she had all of the above-mentioned, could not have any of these fundamental civil rights. Therefore, the female movement for electoral rights, which started in England in the early 19th century, became the first serious challenge on the part of human right against the citizen's rights. The struggle took suffragettes almost 150 years. During this opposition, women had achieved a serious expansion of their rights in different areas, but in the most conservative countries of Europe they received their electoral rights only after World War II. Women's fight for their electoral rights was the longest, while other social categories (hired workers, military men, etc.) received their electoral rights much faster. Actually, the evolution and spread of democracy in the 19th–20th centuries can be described as a steady expansion of numbers of voters in relation to the total population of a country until electoral rights were given to 100% of adult inhabitants of a country.

Achieving the right to elect and be elected, it was necessary to temporize and, having achieved the rights, – to assume more and more obligations. Such obligations' brightest example is the compulsory universal military obligation. These civil compromises' nature has one way or another to do with encroachments on private life. Having received 100% electoral rights (as well as almost total completeness of civil rights), citizens began to struggle against entrenchments upon their private life and for civil society's full autonomization. Still, such a struggle, in its turn, demands development of civil consciousness and civicism. This struggle's arguments are also scientific knowledge from the areas of biology, psychology, history, and pedagogics. Back in the 19th century, biology, psychology, and eugenics were used to prove the racial and gender inequality. The need in scientific argumentation was revealed most vividly during the fight for the legal equality of black people. The first anti-slavery and black people's legal equality movements in the 18th century used some religious substantiation (the Clapham Sect), but in the 19th century anthropology and racial theory acted

as a counterargument to the Christian treatment of the human equality. Therefore, the struggle against racism took place not only in the political space, but also in scientific discussions. In the 20th century, the subsequent growth of scientific knowledge, including that of society and a human being, had brought the notions «citizenship» and «civicism» up to the level of a complex interdisciplinary problem.

3. Transformation of representations about the citizen and citizenship in history

The citizen is a cultural-historical notion filled with different meanings and values in various historical situations. Therefore, a substantial-genetic analysis, i.e. a study of the origin and development of historical forms of citizenship and civicism, is obligatory at work with the notion «citizen». Modern citizenship has been developing for centuries: partially through ancient archaic forms' evolution, partially when different cultures and nations borrowed civicism forms and relations from other nations, and partially when conquerors inculcated their standards to the conquered people. The history is full of various forms of civicism and civil relations. If we adhere to historical scientific severity, we shall face with a vast material and sink in various details and nuances. Therefore, before a historical analysis, we have to allocate some logic types and offer logic patterns which can become a basis of the substantial-genetic analysis of the evolution and variability of the notion «citizen», as well as historical forms and relations of civicism.

Citizenship is a person's attitude to the state and that of the state to a person, including their mutual acknowledgment of sovereignty and mutual obligations. The state recognizes infeasible rights of the citizen and his/her political subjectivity and autonomy; the citizen recognizes the sovereignty of the state and delegates some of the rights to it.

Civicism is a degree of a person's possession of his/her sovereign inalienable rights and freedoms, ability to civil conduct and action. Civicism defines a person's abilities and desire to use the rights and freedoms, his/her participation in society's and state's affairs. A person is free to use the rights or not to use them, to delegate them to someone, or to leave them unclaimed.

The majority of modern people are citizens of some state or even several ones, if their laws admit double and more citizenship. There are exceptions: some categories of people happen to be stateless persons. In olden days, nobody cared of this phenomenon (stateless persons), but today it becomes a subject of special attention of the national and international public, and one way or another it is being solved. However, people do not often think why they became citizens or received citizenship. For the overwhelming majority, citizenship is given by birth, i.e. they do not have to make an effort to get it. However, citizenship by birth is non-uniform. In some cases, it is necessary to be born in a family of citizens, and then one will automatically receive citizenship of one of the parents. In some cases, it is possible to be born on the territory of a state (e.g. the USA.) Besides heritable citizenship or citizenship by birth, there is also application citizenship. In different states, there are various procedures of naturalization. It is seldom, but even in the modern world, there is a practice to grant citizenship to inhabitants of conquered or annexed territories. In the modern world, despite of different bureaucratic complexities, procedures of naturalizing, granting and receiving citizenship are automated. But it has not been always like that. There were times when in order to get citizenship, one needed to have a personal touch, e.g. take an oath. An adjuration means no automatism, even if an oath is taken by a huge number of people of conquered cities or lands. The history of many nations have episodes when these nations' representatives founded new states, sometimes it was the result of revolutions, sometimes — the result of empires' disintegration.

No matter how modern citizenship is received, it historically dates back to some conscious action when certain human communes

founded a state. Forms of this establishment could be very different, e.g. a tribe's decision to make a certain territory sovereign, individual decisions of inhabitants of some territory to recognize the sovereignty of a monarch or conqueror, etc. Destiny or a chance to establish or to found statehood is given to one of many generations of people. The subsequent generations, even though they have some possibility to influence the ancestors' decision, generally live according to the established rules and standards, studying establishments of the first citizens, mastering and implementing them in new historical conditions. We shall try to reduce civil relations' variety to several ideal types. Thus, allocating these types, we shall have some parameters and basic relations:

1. The way citizenship was established.
2. The way the citizen participates in the state's affairs and that of the state in those of a citizen.
3. Mutual rights and obligations of the citizen and the state.

Even being limited to such a small amount of parameters, we face with a huge variety of historical forms. Relations of the state and citizens are constantly changing; therefore we will have to consider these parameters in their most general view. The basis of our approach is the idea about four types or historical formations of citizenship and civicism, which can be described with the help of socio-historical practice: the *quirite*, the national, the citizen of a nation-state, and the citizen of United Europe.

We resort to the generalizing term «**quirite**» to name practices of establishing and regulating citizenship and civicism during a long historical period when the Western civilization was formed. The bases of this type of socio-historical practice started to develop in antique city-states and finished in self-governing cities of the Middle Ages and New Time.

The term «**national**» describes a socio-historical practice which regulated relations of a person and a state when European nations

were formed; it was completed in absolutist monarchies and empires which existed prior to the beginning of the 20th century.

The term «**citizen of a nation-state**» designates a practice of regulating relations of a person and a state which began with the great American and French revolutions, covering the period of the formation and existence of modern European nations and civil society in its modern understanding.

The last term «**citizen of United Europe**» means a teething socio-historical practice of regulating relations of a person, a state, and civil society, which is being developed now in consolidating and extending Europe of the late 20th century. Let's consider these types more in detail.

3.1 The *quirite*: city-states' citizenship

The first type of civicism appears in the Ancient World's autochthonous states based on pre-state tribal and communal relations. No matter who, conquerors or local residents, founded such states, the general rule for such states was a precise and strict division of people into citizens and non-citizens, into those who have the right to participate in politics and the state's affairs, and those who do not have this right. It is not important that this right can only have a symbolical character or is minimal. This type has the clearest forms in city-states developed in ancient civilizations from India to the Mediterranean, which had existed in Europe until the 19th century as self-governing free cities. The same type could be found in rural areas and territories (such as Swiss cantons), but in these cases it seldom reached any high forms of development and was expressed even less often in the written right. We shall call such a form of citizenship and civicism the Ancient Rome's term «*quirite*» (*quiris*, *quiritis* in Latin).

The **quirite** (townsman-citizen, burgher, bourgeois) is *a citizen of a city-state by his birthright and heritability of political legal capacity within the framework of this city-state.*

This term of the Roman Law concerns all politically capable persons who participated in the management of city-states in antiquity

and free self-governing states in the Middle Ages and New Time. In Belarus, this category includes townspeople of ancient Polotsk and the cities which had the Magdeburg Right in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The most distinctive features of this type of civicism:

1. A precise division into *citizens for whom all political rights are declared, and non-citizens*, i.e. strangers, slaves, conquered population, criminals, betrayers, etc. As a rule, citizens are descendants or heirs of the heroic generation of ancestors who founded the state or divided the territory, having assumed mutual obligations to protect and life-support this territory.

2. *Citizens' participation in political life.* Quirites (or whatever they were called in their city-states) are the source of the government and decision-making at the highest level. In the earliest city-states, participation in political life could be limited to participation in public assemblies which sizes were limited by the state's sizes. An orator could talk to a crowd of 10,000 people, and these ten thousand could hear, understand, agree, or not agree with him. The state with a greater number of citizens was considered to be impossible by the first theorists of such statehood and civicism. In Athens, in the heyday of polis democracy, there were much more people, but no more than 10,000 persons used to gather at the Agora public assembly. Demographic, economic, political, and military factors resulted in the fact that a public assembly became inefficient, and in developing city-states there were more and more complex forms of carrying out citizens' political will. On the one hand, it led to the invention of forms of representative democracy and a complicated state structure which demanded the advanced written right. On the other hand, it gave birth to a special political class who usurped the power, but preserved other citizens' political rights in its only decorative kind, just like it was, for instance, at the late stages of the existence of Genoa and Venice. In case when citizens did not cope with arising complexities of the state management, the power was seized by tyrants and dictators in classical antiquity, or such city-states transferred their sovereignty to

feudal princes and kings in the Middle Ages. Sometimes, citizens themselves made decisions to invite a prince and refused their sovereignty and participation in political life (medieval Novgorod, Pskov, and Polotsk).

3. *The super value of city-states' autonomy.* The value of freedom, including political freedom, is a distinctive feature of this type of civicism. The protection of freedom personified by autonomy (i.e. life under one's own laws passed independently by citizens) is the main dominant of such states' political life. When it was possible, such cities kept their autonomy even when they were a part of absolutist monarchies of the New Time. Their laws, standards, and rules of management, among which the Roman Law is one of the highest displays, are alive even today, being the basis of modern local democracy and self-government.

4. Quirites and citizens of similar city-states cultivated *some special patriotism* linked to individualism and freedom. Polis democracy's fundamental provisions and characteristic features of polis patriotism, formulated by Pericles in his well-known speech (431 B.C.), could be repeated by politicians, leaders, and simple citizens of numerous city-states from antiquity to our days. Such patriotism differs strongly from knights' fidelity of the early Middle Ages and loyal subjects' patriotism during the epoch of absolutism and empires of the 19th century and totalitarian regimes of the 20th century.

The Athenian strategist Pericles' well-known obituary speech pronounced over tombs of soldiers who were the first to perish at the beginning of Peloponnesus War, was preserved by the Greek historian Thucydides.

«Our form of government does not imitate others' establishments; we ourselves serve as an example for some others, rather than imitating others. This form is called «democratic» because it is grounded not on a minority, but the majority (demos). As for private interests, our laws provide the legal equality for all; as for a political value, in our state life, everyone uses it preferably before another not by virtue of the fact that he is supported by this or that political party, but depending on his valor gained by him in this or that good business; similarly, the modesty of a

rank is not a poor man's encumbrance to activity, if only he can render any service to the state. We live free political life in the state and are not suspicious in mutual relations of daily life; we are not irritated if somebody does something to his liking, and we do not show our disappointment, even though it is harmless, but nevertheless depressing for him. Being free from any coercion in private life, in public relations we do not break any laws mainly because we fear them, and we obey the persons clothed with authority right now; in particular, we listen to all the laws which exist for the benefit of the offended, and which, being unwritten, if they are infringed, lead to public disgrace.»

(Thucydides' History, translated by F. G. Mishchenko, processed by S. A. Zhebelev, V. 1-2, Moscow, 1915; cited by Antique Literature Chrestomathy. In 2 volumes. For higher educational institutions. V. 1. N. F. Deratani, N. A. Timofeeva. Greek Literature. - Moscow, Prosveshchenie, 1965 - p. 37-38.)

3.2 The national: feudal-absolutist states

Another type of civicism was formed on the basis of feudal relations in the Middle Ages and the feudal law. Like the ancient city-states, the early feudal states could be founded by conquerors or tribal alliances on their own territory. However, the lifeway linked to the ineffective agricultural tenor demanded other relations between people who did appreciate military valor and mutual military favors to each other, while their social relations were built on loyalty and fidelity rather than political freedoms. Therefore, the feudal states were characterized by domination of military leaders controlling their territory, and were initially constructed as monarchic. The monarch was the source of sovereignty and the highest arbiter who did not need any other people to take part in the state management. In the medieval feudal states, there was a representation about the right which differed much from the Roman Law or the city-states' right. If the *quirites'* right provided everybody with equal or quasi-equal rights and regulated vexed questions between equal citizens, then the feudal law was treated as a right to do something: the right not to bare one's head in front of a

king or the right to tax inhabitants of a certain territory, the right to control trade ways, etc. The right did not equalize, but sort different people within the borders of one state. In such states, there were no citizens, even such as the *quirites* described above; in such states, there were the monarch's nationals (i.e. subjects, homagers, or the governed). It was possible to be born as a *quirite* in the same way as it was possible to be born in the family of an aristocrat - feudal lord, but the only way for an aristocrat to become a national of a certain feudal suzerain was to be knighted or to take an oath to the monarch. The feudal states were associated not with a group of citizens, but one person who had the full sovereignty. During his life, any feudal lord could be a subject of several monarchs.

Early feudal forms of citizenship were developed and mastered in absolutist monarchies of the New Time. If in the Middle Ages feudal landowners coexisted with free cities' citizens-*quirites* and had difficult relations with them (wars), then during the epoch of absolutist monarchies the unification of these types of state relations and relations of civicism began. An absolutist state, on the one hand, tried to spread feudal relations among all free population and, on the other hand, to regulate these relations on the basis of the written law cultivated in cities. If in the Middle Ages a king or another feudal lord could conquer a city, then, having it as his own political and economic unit, he swore to preserve this city's liberties and to respect its autonomy and laws. During the epoch of absolutist states, citizens of cities conquered by a monarch, had to take a personal oath to the monarch or a collective oath announced by an elected representative. Even at the end of the 18th century, Königsberg's citizen Immanuel Kant took an oath to the Russian empress who conquered Eastern Prussia.

Special features of allegiance:

1. *Personal acceptance of allegiance.* Here, the leading part is played by elements of the feudal common law. Allegiance is not automatic, and even if the fact of birth or origin is priority, allegiance nevertheless requires self-determination and constant confirmation.

Allegiance can be changed; it is also possible to change one monarch's allegiance to another's one.

2. *Nationals' inequality*. Different categories of homagers can have different privileges and feudal rights. Feudal freedoms and liberties differ essentially from the understanding of these categories in free cities where there is a quirite type of citizenship.

3. *Rightlessness, or a bonded condition of big groups of the population on their territory*. In the early Middle Ages, free people, rural and city communities still had some rights, but in absolutist states, these rights are not taken into account, if only they are not confirmed by special agreements or given by sovereigns. Organized communities could achieve confirmation or establishment of their rights or privileges.

4. *Allegiance is built on a contract basis*. Mutual rights and duties of a monarch and the governed are established every time separately for each case. The category «allegiance» means a voluntary transition to somebody's protection or patronage and assumption of certain obligations to the monarch who, in his turn, commits himself to protect his subjects and their rights and privileges. The feudal treatment of freedom presupposes the freedom of changing allegiance and being protected by another monarch if he guarantees more protection and privileges.

During absolutist monarchs' evolution and development, the allegiance relations are spread among more and more wide categories of the controlled territories' population. The population's organized groups and communities make the monarch to declare their rights and privileges, at least when they can prove their material opulence, ability to pay taxes, and to support the state financially. Almost in all absolutist monarchies, there is a certain social class principle which precisely differentiates «service class» subjects (who are guaranteed their rights' and privileges' protection by the state) from «tax class» subjects (who purchase their rights' protection and guarantees by voluntary paying taxes). Of course, this «voluntariness» should be

understood conditionally, but nevertheless when the «tax class» subjects started their economic strengthening, there was a practice to ask their opinions concerning questions of war and peace, tax increases, etc. There were convocations of national assemblies, e.g. General States in France, Valny Sojm in Rzeczpospolita (the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), or Zemsky Sobor in Muscovy. By lapse of time, allegiance relations spread among all estates living on the territory under the monarch's jurisdiction, except for personally dependent (serfs). In the early 19th century in Europe, and the 2nd half of the 19th century in the Russian Empire, the allegiance category touched practically the whole population of the corresponding states.

The allegiance relations have no references to what civil rights a person has and can use. In some cases, a strong state, not providing a person with any civil rights, can protect its people to a greater degree from high-handedness both inside and outside the country, unlike a weak, but democratic state. However, a national, being defended from abuse or aggression on the part of other subjects, can remain completely defenseless in the face of his/her own state.

The national is a person who belongs to a certain state and is protected by this state.

In many respects, the status of a nation-state's citizen and that of a national coincide. The state they belong to, can equally protect them and guarantee their safety inside and outside the country. A national differs from a nation-state's citizen by a degree of participation in the country's public and political life and the fact that the citizen's rights and freedoms are unconditional and inalienable whereas the national's rights and freedoms depend on the mechanism of the government, its laws and legal practice. A citizen him/herself is a source of rights and freedoms and a subject of political will. On the contrary, it is the state that acts as a source of its nationals' rights, freedoms, and privileges; the national participates in the country's public and political life to the degree allowed by state's laws, customs, or legal practice spread in this country.

Having covered the whole territory of Europe, statehood did spread all over the civilized world; there were no territories left, which had no jurisdiction of this or that state. In the civilized world, all population was shared between these states, everyone was nationals of some state, but it did not mean all of them were citizens and could have their civil rights. In international relations, in private affairs and business, the nationals of the Russian or Ottoman Empires, the French Republic or the United States of America were perceived as similar subjects. Nevertheless, they had a completely different legal status and possibilities of participating in their states' affairs. In many states in the 20th century, nationals did achieve civil rights as a result of revolutions or democratic changes. The totalitarian regimes' establishment hampered this process; therefore the Soviet Union's population remained in the status of the governed until its collapse. Inhabitants of European and other democratic states studied to be citizens of a new type during many generations, while the majority of Soviet people still see no difference between allegiance and national citizenship even now.

Such «see-no-difference» vivid example can be found in dictionary entries of the Soviet time:

Citizen

1. A national of some state. «An American citizen.» «Here is he (proletariat), the creator of global work and the citizen of the whole universe.»

2. A conscious member of society. A person for whom public interests are more important than his/her own. «You might not be a poet, but you ought to be a citizen» by Nekrasov.

3. An adult person, a man. «An unknown citizen is crushed by a tram.»
|| a form of address to a man. «Citizen, wait!»

4. A hereditary honorable citizen (before the October Revolution), a title given to commoners for their merits or due to the educational qualification.

(D. N. Ushakov's Russian Explanatory Dictionary in 4 volumes. V. 1. Moscow, 1935; V. 2. Moscow, 1938; V. 3. Moscow, 1939; V. 4. Moscow, 1940)

Citizenship – a person's belonging to some state with the rights and duties established by this state's legislation protecting these rights. In states with a monarchic form of government, the term «allegiance» is used.

Allegiance, see Citizenship.

(Big Soviet Encyclopedia)

3.3 The citizen: nation-states

The third type of citizenship starts to develop in the 18th century. When absolutist monarchies developed, European nations were formed. When national uniformity was achieved, ethnic differences were erased; during the struggle for rights and limitations of the privileged estates' rights, social uniformity increased. At the same time, in the 18th century two systems, two orders of relations between the state and the person coexisted, sometimes within the same state. In free self-governing cities and archaic republics, there were modified variants of quiritic relations, while in strengthened absolutist monarchies, there were allegiance relations. Quiritic rights were a basis for a social and civil ideal. However, this ideal's theoretical substantiation in works of ancient philosophers and theorists of democracy did not make it possible to implement this ideal in the states controlling huge territories with millions-strong population. It was only the age of Enlightenment that managed to prove theoretically and develop such representations about civil rights and the mechanism of the government which could be carried out in social practice.

The first large state which managed to spread civil rights among the whole population, was the United States of America freed from the English monarchy. However, even here this type of citizenship and civicism was only implemented partially.

First, civil rights' more or less complete implementation was only possible within the borders of separate States. Therefore, the United States' founders built a confederate state on the model of Switzerland;

democracy itself was isolated in separate States and did not work at the federal level.

Second, citizenship was not given to black slaves and indigenous American-Indian population. Nonetheless, the United States as a federative state became, on the one hand, a laboratory to improve a transition from democracy at the local level to representative democracy at the national level, and on the other hand, the States mastered a transition from the archaic form of state unions and small city-states' associations or democratically controlled territories (e.g. the Hanseatic League, Swiss Confederation, or United Provinces of the Netherlands) to a unitary democratic nation-state. Civil relations' further development has to do with the Great French Revolution.

A nation-state's citizen is a legally capable subject of all public and political relations within the framework of the state and civil society.

We have to confine the notion «citizen» to several meanings.

First, a belonging to a certain state. It is the state that recognizes or not a person as its citizen, and certifies adequately a citizen's civil status. A person can be born and live all life on the territory of a certain state, not being a citizen of this state, thus limiting his/her possibilities to participate in public and political life. He/she can be either a citizen of another state, or a stateless person.

Second, a legal capacity. The young persons are legally recognized by the state as citizens, but they have no possibilities to participate in public and political life because of their legal incapacity. They are protected by the state, their civil rights in the future can be guaranteed, and in the present they can have some particular rights compensating their age disability. In this respect, they can be defined as nationals rather than citizens.

*The categories «citizenship» and «civicism» are applicable to the **citizen** and inapplicable to the **national**. The national is characterized more likely by fidelity, law-abiding-ness, and patriotism. Nobody expects a civil action and political initiative from the national.*

The Great French Revolution is often called «bourgeois». In Soviet social science, the terms «bourgeois» and «bourgeoisie» were reduced down to vulgar Marxist treatment. The notion's initial meaning, i.e. a «townsman», «urbanite», was graded, and only the meaning «bloodsucker», «private owner» was left. Coming back to the initial sense, it is possible to say that the French Revolution was a fight of the townsfolk for the spread of civil relations of the original quirite type among the whole population. It was done at the cost of their refusal from the rights guaranteed by the Crown, and their substitute for the quirite right.

Certainly, the privileged estates' refusal from their rights was not and could not be voluntary, therefore it was necessary to liquidate a class division at all. Ideological substantiation to liquidate society's estates division with its different rights became the categories of freedom, equality, and brotherhood filled with the general value. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was to implement this ideology. All people were recognized equal, and each of them was given civil rights. But the Declaration is called a «declaration» because it only declares some principles which implementation can take decades. Nevertheless, for the first time in history the French Revolution implemented the rights of the citizen, proclaimed back in the Roman Law and enjoyed by few townspeople of free city-republics, within a huge country with the millions-strong population and in the unitary state.

Citizenship and civicism established by the French Republic, declared by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and formed legislatively in Napoleon's Code, became the norm and example for other European nations. Partially together with Napoleon's Code, this type was distributed during revolutionary wars of the early 19th century. Thus, this type of citizenship was established in Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and western German states. Then, it was spread and introduced by a series of bourgeois revolutions in European countries and wars to unite Italy and Germany. It was

only in Scandinavian countries where these forms of citizenship and civicism were introduced in a peaceful and voluntary way.

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen

Approved by the National Assembly of France, 26 August 1789

The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all. Therefore the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and of the citizen:

Articles:

- 1.** Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good.
- 2.** The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.
- 3.** The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body, nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.
- 4.** Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law.

5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law.

6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents.

7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary order, shall be punished. But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without delay, as resistance constitutes an offense.

8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of the offense.

9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed by law.

10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.

11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.

12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be entrusted.

13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of administration. This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means.

14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the mode of assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes.

15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration.

16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.

17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.

// The French Republic: Constitution and legislative acts. - Moscow, 1989. - p. 26-29.

Special features of a nation-state's citizenship and civicism:

1. *Civil rights and freedoms*, and the equality of all people before the law in this type of citizenship could only be implemented within a nation and with the help or by means of a nation-state. Actually, this very type of citizenship and civicism constitutes modern nations, which unity developed back in absolutist monarchies and empires or their ethnic provinces. In a sense, a nation, nation-state, and civil society are formed synchronously in the same territorial borders and during the same historical epoch. The national unity and advanced civil society guarantee the nation-state's stability and sustainability, while the nation-state itself creates and provides conditions for the existence, functioning, and development of the nation and civil society. The citizen of this period is self-defined as a part of these three wholes: the nation, civil society, and the state. The Europeans have mastered this type of citizenship for 150 years.

2. *Citizens of one nation were equal among themselves* and free to the degree allowed by the state they founded, which acted on their

behalf. Still, citizens of one state could not be equal to citizens of another state. The protection and guarantee of citizens' rights and freedoms depended on the state's force, power, stability, and sustainability.

The inequality of different states' citizens is revealed vividly in the following verses from Vladimir Mayakovsky's poem *My Soviet Passport* (1929):

For one kind of passport - smiling lips part	from an American.
For others - an attitude scornful.	At the Polish, they dolefully blink and wheeze in dumb
They take with respect, for instance, the passport	police elephantism - where are they from, and what are these
From a sleeping-car English Lionel.	geographical novelties?
The good fellows' eyes almost slip like pips	And without a turn of their cabbage heads, their feelings
when, bowing as low as men can,	hidden in lower regions, they take without blinking,
they take, as if they were taking a tip,	the passports from Swedes and various
the passport	old Norwegians.

Source: Sputnik no.12/1982, translated by Herbert Marshall

A nation-state, a nation, and civil society, being placed in one spatial and time borders, develop non-uniformly. Sometimes, a state's consolidation and development outstrip a nation's and civil society's formation, e.g. in Germany which unification in a joint state with Prussia's defining and dominating role resulted in the German nation's formation. Due to the authoritative nature of the developing state and militarism advertised by Prussian ruling class, civil society's development was hampered. An opposite example can be demonstrated by the Slav nations in the Austrian Empire where nationalism and national development outstripped the development of civil society and national statehood which were hampered by the Empire.

A nation, in our context, is a big assemblage of people who define statehood or who can pretend to their right to self-determine and create a state in the short term.

The volume of the notion «nation» coincides with that of the concept «nation-state». In this context, a nation can be opposed historically to a city-state. We do not have to consider ethnic, confessional, and culturological aspects of the notion «nation». New civil society is also defined by the same assemblage of people. During the period when nation-states appear and exist, volumes and borders of a state, a nation, and civil society in space and time practically coincide.

Our theme's frameworks do not presuppose a detailed discussion of the categories «nation», «nationalism», and «national development»; the subject of our interest now is citizenship, civicism, and partly civil society. As for Byelorussia and other national outskirts of the Russian Empire, these processes are to be reviewed separately. The process to include Grand Lithuanians (today's Belarusians) in the joint nation of unitary Rzeczpospolita began almost simultaneously with the French bourgeois revolution. The Constitution passed on 3 May 1791, declared a unitarian state of united Rzeczpospolita, thus replacing the two nations' liquidated federation based on the estate principle with absolutist elements. However, the declared state turned out to be weak and was conquered by its neighboring absolutist empires.

On the lands occupied by the Russian Empire, civil society's development practically stopped completely. Even its prerequisites existed in self-governing cities which had the right to be self-governed (even though archaic, medieval one), were eliminated. Therefore, the Russian Empire's nations had only one possibility left, i.e. nationalism and a nation's creation, even if under the imperial oppression. This circumstance rescued Belarusians from the Polish assimilation, but exposed them to the Russian absorption and severed them from the all-European development.

During that epoch, a different type of development is shown by Finland which had a very high degree of autonomy, being a part of

the Russian Empire. The Finnish nation was formed in soft conditions of the emancipation from Sweden's and Swedish cultural domination, which was partially promoted by its dependence on the Russian Empire, while its autonomy spurred civil society's development. By the moment when Finland became independent, all elements of its civil society which were possible by the beginning of the 20th century, had already been created and reached a certain level of development. As for some things, Finland was even in the lead, thus it was the first in Europe to provide women with the electoral right.

This heterochronism, non-uniformity of states', nations', and civil societies' development, created numerous contradictions and conflicts, both inside separate states and in the all-European context. These clashes and contrarities peaked out by World War I. No matter what World War I's formal aftermath was, it havocked archaic states, first of all, absolutist empires: Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman. As a result of that war, the nations occupied by these empires could implement their right to self-determination. In defeated Germany, the one German nation was formed, but its civil society was still feeble and could not stand against the Nazi dictatorship. Most of the processes we describe were completed by the majority of European nations during the period between the two world wars. Then, it became clear that a state as guarantor for citizens' rights and freedoms can only guarantee its citizens' rights and freedoms within its own borders, being not able to protect them from outside threats. The rights and freedoms of the citizen, especially a human being as such, were not guaranteed and protected in continental and world politics.

3.4 The citizen of United Europe: a developing type of citizenship

After World War I, European states tried to set their hands at the problem of the absence of mechanisms protecting the rights of the citizen and the person on the interstate level. We talk about the creation of the League of Nations (1920—1946), as well as about bi- and multilateral treaties and agreements during that period. In particular,

there was an attempt to normalize the legal status of stateless persons who could receive special documents, so-called Nansen passports. Their rights and freedoms were to be guaranteed by the world community. Still, it is important to underline that both League of Nations and bi- and multilateral treaties were created by the states which identified themselves with the nations, while civil society took no part in it. By that time, there was no civil society outside nations' and states' frontiers. Civil society was not a subject of international relations.

Nansen passports were temporary identity cards that replaced national passports for refugees and stateless persons; introduced by the League of Nations in 1922 following the Geneva conference's decision. It was a proposal of the Norwegian scientist and public figure Fridtjof Nansen. The people with such passports had the right to live and move within the member states of the Geneva agreements; they were freed from a number of limitations stipulated for those who had no citizenship.

World War II became the most egregious in the history of humankind precedent of callous disregard of human and civil rights. None human rights, nor human life were neither guaranteed, nor protected. Not only during the war, but also in the totalitarian states that had prepared and initiated this war, the industry of mass destruction of people did reach tremendous scales. Millions of innocent people were repressed, killed, and deported. None personal efforts could stand against this industry. After World War II was over, the global agenda's sharpest question concerned human rights, what or who can guarantee these rights, and how to provide these guarantees. The main subject was still a state, and it was the victorious states that started to solve these problems. In lieu of the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization was created, and one of all other tasks was to ensure human rights, including these rights' protection against the state's intrusion. If the League of Nations focused on interstate questions' and problems' solution, then the United Nations declared human and civil rights' protection irrespective of what state's citizenship a person has.

In 1948, the United Nations passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which not only continued and supplemented the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, but also spread these rights among all people without exception, regardless their citizenship and nationality. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared people's equality within the nation and obliged the nation-state to provide this equality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights cancelled these restrictions. All people were recognized equal; only one thing was not clear – who, how, and with what means can and will implement this equality. The history and world politics of the 1st half of the 20th century had shown that states and nations were not able to provide the equality, rights, and freedoms of not only all people, but even their own citizens or nationals.

There was an acute necessity of seeking for, or inventing, new mechanisms to ensure the equality of human rights and freedoms, and new subjects capable of assuming responsibility for it. Thus, the new subject became **civil society** which surmounted nations' barriers and states' frontiers. The democratic states' governments, which got the victory in World War II and set the style in international organizations, happened to be able to refuse their monopoly in international questions' solutions and started to settle matters with the help of civil society's national structures. Entering the international level, these structures and people participating in them became a basis of the developing world community. The further history can be presented as an interaction and cooperation of states (their governments) and civil society.

These interaction and cooperation resulted in the origin of essentially new, without historical precedents all-European institutions and international treaties, with the European Union, Council of Europe, and Helsinki agreements being the main ones. Perhaps, the most important institutional achievement of states' and civil society's cooperation was abridgement of states' sovereignty both in internal and foreign politics, at least where this sovereignty leads to states' despotism and ruling elites' egoism. The voluntary renunciation of a part of sovereignty becomes a possibility and a

condition of a country's participation in the Council of Europe and European Union.

If during the period from the American and French revolutions of the 17th — 18th centuries to the end of World War II, a state and a nation were a limiting framework defining rights and freedoms of the person and the citizen (and simultaneously they limited these rights and freedoms, even though it was their duty to protect and guarantee them), then in the 2nd half of the 20th century, rights and freedoms of the person and the citizen are defined within the framework of supranational civil society and guaranteed by the international community without taking into account national borders. Nation-states' sovereignty concerning rights and freedoms of their citizens is admitted only to the degree in which national norms and legislation are harmonized with all-European standards guaranteeing rights and freedoms of the person.

The basic international arrangements concerning human rights, as well as the main events connected to these arrangements' signing and implementation, are well described and widely known. They are usually reviewed directly in connection with human rights' contents in their legal and organizational aspects. The aspect of changing the contents of the notions and representations about the citizen, citizenship, and civicism, is more important for us. We can emphasize that since the moment the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was accepted, the notions «citizen», «citizenship», and «civicism» have not just changed quantitatively and qualitatively, but essentially as well.

Previously, a citizen was entirely attached to the state, within the bounds of which he/she could use his/her rights, freedoms, and political will. A citizen could appeal to the state as the last resort in case of infringement of his/her rights and freedoms, and could influence political decisions only in his/her state. During the European institutions' development, a citizen is emancipating from the state. Now, the Europeans' rights and freedoms are guaranteed not only by the state, but the European community, too. European voters directly elect the European Parliament and can become its

deputies, i.e. they have a possibility to carry out their political will outside their states' frontiers, within the frame of European parties and unions. The European Parliament's factions are organized not by a national principle, but political one. A citizen can appeal to the European Court, conflicts between the citizen and the state can be heard both in national courts and the European Court.

The frameworks defining human rights and freedoms, as well as the contents of the notions «citizen» and «civicism», are set not by the state any longer, but civil society which has left the borders of a nation and a state. Before World War II, limits and scales of a person's self-determination and identity were reduced to a nation-state and allowed some local or regional identity. Today, the European identity is added. Nowadays, every person in Europe self-defines not only locally and nationally, but also as a European, and each person decides independently which of these levels of self-determination and identification is on the first place or dominates. Someone can, first of all, be a Walloon, a Jew, or a Polesian [Polesia, or Paleśsie in Belarusan, is a region in southern Belarus], and only then a Belgian, a French person, or a Belarusan; while someone, a contrario, considers him/herself a European and only then a Spaniard or a Catalan, a Pole or a Cassubian.

The European processes historically described by us, are referred to the latest 50–60 years. These processes are far from their completion. It is much less than the 150 years during which representatives of European nations had studied how to be citizens of their nation-states. Nonetheless, already now we can say that in Europe there is a new, developing type of citizens and relations of citizenship and civicism. Saying it, we understand that such a type of the citizen and civicism is not wide-spread; it coexists together with the former civil identity and seems to keep coexisting for a long time. In fact, even now it is possible to meet some people, even big groups of people, who still consider themselves to be nationals rather than citizens.

Right now, there is only the infancy of the fourth of all the types described by us, while in the states which appeared after the USSR

fell apart, the process of nations' development is not over yet, let alone civil society. 15 years are not enough to travel the way which took other states 150 years. All this generates additional problems and difficulties which can be conditionally divided into two big groups.

The first group is difficulties of delay and lag of some nations and cultural regions of Europe, which have to catch up and adjust historically to the leaders. Among the four types of citizens, citizenship, and civicism that we have described, only the quirite is not represented in modern Europe. Today's European nations combine three types or three tenors of civicism: nationality, national citizenship, and European citizenship (with all its conditionality as a term and phenomenon). In different regions of Europe, these three types' combination is presented differently.

In the countries of the former USSR and the Balkans, a significant part of the population still feel themselves as states' nationals; they cannot, do not know how, or do not want to participate in political life. For them, everything is decided by bureaucracy and ruling elites. Neither bureaucracy, nor elites, nor even imitatingly elected deputies are perceived by nationals as their representatives or subjects with whom they could have a dialog on a footing of equality. Nationals consider official bodies, governmental bureaucracy, and ruling elites to be their source of rights, privileges, or preferences.

Another thing is citizens in the same countries, who identify themselves with the nation or civil society and understand themselves as a source of their state's sovereignty and a fount of the powers their governments and parliaments are given. Accordingly, between the part of the population who realize their place in the nation and the state in allegiance categories, and the other part who consider themselves to be citizens, there are constant tensions which from time to time turn into conflicts. It is good if such conflicts are solved by political means; if the ratio of the parts (nationals and citizens) can have a reasonable compromise. In this case, even some politicians' attempts to use this complex situation in their egoistical interests do not result in catastrophes or violence.

A striking example is the situation with Rolandas Paksas in Lietuva [today's Lithuanian Republic = Samogitia]. Paksas won the election by exploiting Lithuanian citizens' paternalistic moods, and at once tried to scant civil rights and political freedoms. Civil society, which had already been formed by that time in this state, managed to react quickly enough and solved the situation, remaining within the framework of the Constitution. Another situation is in Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasian and Balkan states. Civil society's institutions in these countries are very slack. The majority of the population is identified as nationals who do not know their civil rights and do not know how to use them. They put up easily with a dictatorship's arbitrariness in exchange for economic privileges or preferences. Sometimes, in these countries there is a quasi-estate organization of society. At any hand, there are cases of ethnic or confessional discrimination. Rights are treated not in a civil sense as something that makes people equal, but in an archaic, almost feudal meaning, i.e. rights are thought to be presented as a gift or given from above. Ethnic, confessional, or social groups in such countries struggle for some special rights for themselves, achieve certain privileges, but not for equal rights for all. Sometimes, such phenomena can be found in new countries-members of the European Union, e.g. political behavior of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia can be understood and explained in this way. Even in the old EU members, far right or nationalist groups from time to time act according to this very logic, achieving either special rights for the title nation, or swaddling minorities' rights.

Simultaneously, in the EU countries, as well as the countries applying for or dreaming of the EU membership, there is an appearing and widening layer of people with the European identity, realizing themselves citizens of big Europe, who learn how to use the European infrastructure and to actively participate in the European institutions.

The other group of difficulties is difficulties the Europeans face for the first time. They are caused by the infancy of the new type of citizenship and civicism. If during the origin of national civil relations, human rights were implemented in relative completeness only for

citizens, and only citizens could use them within their states' borders, while non-citizens used to face with their rights' and freedoms' limitations, then by the 21st century, rights of both person and citizen are spread among the same set of people. On the one hand, it leads to human rights' autonomy and self-sufficiency, and, on the other hand, to a substantial narrowing of the notions «citizenship» and «civil rights». Civil rights are reduced to political ones, and, to some extent, political duties are accented instead of rights. Civil political rights' implementation becomes burdensome. In order to elect local authorities, one level of knowledge and competencies is needed, while quite another level of knowledge and competencies is necessary to participate fully in political life at national and European levels, to elect national and European authorities, and then to control their activity. Due to the fact that everybody uses these rights, it reduces representation democracy's quality and civil participation's motivation. There are a growing number of citizens who do not understand what and who they vote for, and how their voting affects their life. Still, there is no way back. Today, it is already impossible to come back to qualifications and restrict civil rights of these or those people. Therefore, civil education's charge is growing; European intellectuals are preoccupied with civil education's new contents and a conceptualization of the notions «citizen» and «civicism».

Conclusion

The presented typology of citizenship and civicism allows us not only to receive a scheme to analyze the real problem situation in modern Europe and its integral part – Belarus. It is necessary to specificate problems, successes and failures, achievements and losses, in order to implement Belarusian civil society's development strategy and to modernize economic, political, and cultural areas. Today, specifics are often substituted by abstract schemes borrowed uncritically from experiences of countries which situation differs essentially from that in Belarus. If Western European countries have to solve problems generated by the infancy of the new type of civicism, then the Belarusian situation is aggravated by the previous types' unsolved problems. One problems are imposed on others. The thing is not only in such problems' bunching, but in half-baked notions and representations, the weakness and backwardness of humanitarian knowledge, and unpreparedness of politicians, managers, and experts.

Methodology of social knowledge inherited from historical and dialectic materialism imposes a principle of legitimacy and determinacy of historical development, but history has no objective determination. The social structure's formations and types are not replaced automatically by natural laws. They are changed by people who understand the challenges of time and think specifically, or who

do not understand and act according to common, abstract representations.

In civil education in Belarus, we face with the fact that a big volume of works and huge human efforts are not productive because they do not solve concrete problems, but simply imitate other countries' experiences or reproduce old stereotypes. Politicians, teachers, and trainers of civil education in the third sector are working, not understanding the concrete situation.

The typology we suggest, and the notions and categories we develop, are not supposed to be directly broadcast in civil education. They can be used to define objectives and state tasks in concrete situations of civil education in concrete time intervals. They are to transform the third sector's chaotic, not purposeful activity in civil education into programmed and purposeful work. On the other hand, they oppose state-run civil education's purposefulness which spreads archaic forms of civicism (allegiance).

It is worth reminding that notions and categories do not act per se, but like tools, i.e. when they are used as a basis for concrete curricula, techniques, and manuals, and when the whole system of civil education is harmonized with the purposes and tasks formulated and inferred from these notions and categories.

This typology has been used by the HTA project group to develop a civil education concept, civil education standards, and a training course for trainers and organizers, grounded on this concept and an educational-methodical complex. It has allowed us to define prospects and tasks of developing the contents of civil education and its organization in the context of the general evolution of civicism.

In the short term, the task is to change a ratio of passive citizens with etatism and paternalistic points of view and people with an active civic stand to the level when civil society would be able to control the Belarusian state and make it work for national interests.

In the mid term, the task of civil education in Belarus is to ensure or teach Belarusian citizens the all-European values and to provide

the Belarusians' European identity. Right now, the European identity training is imposed on civil passivity and leads not to civil participation's enlargement, but on the contrary — to a consumerist attitude.

The *motto and value* of civil education in Belarus *in the short term* can and should be **Belarusianization** understood as completion of the Belarusian nation's development and construction of a contemporary state according to demands of the international and, first of all, European community, which is limited by strong and active civil society. To achieve this understanding, it is needed to criticize and destroy the widespread treatment of Belarusianization as a strictly nationalist project concentrated on linguistic, ethnic, and cultural problems.

The *motto and value* of civil education in Belarus *in the mid term* can and should be **Europeanization**, i.e. to add the fourth of the described by us types of civicism to civil education within the framework of the nation-state and to affix Belarus to the main European institutions and programs. It does not matter which way of joining the Belarusian state and civil society will choose: the EU membership or participation in the European institutions and programs on the model of Switzerland or Norway. For this purpose, it is necessary to criticize and destroy representations about Europeanization as Westernization reduced mainly to western standards of consumption.

In the long term, the Belarusian nation and civil society on a par with other European nations and within the scope of all-European civil society will be able to be included in the solution of new arising problems and tasks which will be actual by then. However, without settling the matters in the short and mid terms, it is not possible.