The Head of the Department on Russia and CIS of the German Council for Foreign Policy, Aleksandr Rar replied to these and other questions.

Q: "Given the current situation, is it possible to understand what goals Russia pursued in Georgia? An agreement to seize fire has been signed however Russian army seems to have taken control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as some other cities of Georgia: Gori, and Poti. So what do they aim for?

Also on the other hand it is not clear in what way these uncertain moves of the Russian Army relate to the curious construction of the power in Russia: is it a result of the President Medvedev signing documents and then doing something different or is it a result of him signing the documents while the real orders are issued to the Army by Putin?”

A: “I believe that Medvedev as the Chief Commander, indeed signed an order to the Russian Army to return to South Ossetia where they were previously located as a ‘piece corps’ in compliance with the CIS mandate. However we receive reports that Russian Army was still in Gori and in Poti near Tbilisi. That rises a question to what extent the Army is fulfilling the order of Medvedev.

I think it is so. However there is an issue related to the fact that the defeated Georgian army is not capable to control the territory itself and the South Ossetian bands penetrate there. There is no Georgian Army there and the Russian Army is leaving the place. It seems to me that there is a ‘black hole’ in the centre of Georgia which is beyond anyone’s control. That is not safe for the region”.

Q: “What do you think would be the fate of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in your opinion? Positions the USA and Russia stand in this regard are polar: the Secretary of the State, Reiss says that the territorial integrity of Georgia is an unalienable principle, while her Russian colleague Lavrov claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would never be a part of Georgia. At the same time the President Medvedev says that Russia will be a guarantor of any status of these republics, regardless of what they finally chose.

The position of the European countries is not very clear, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy in the course of the negotiations with Dmitry Medvedev agreed to include in a ‘seize fire’ agreement a clause on international agreement regarding the status of these two republics however later on he agreed to disclose this clause following a demand of the President Mikhail Saakashvili. So what would be the status of these two republics?”

A: “It is hard to talk about their ‘de jure’ status at the moment. The International law is interpreted by Russia and the West in a very different way. I would agree with Medvedev’s opinion that after the military invasion of Georgia against its population it would be hard to imagine that Ossetia and Abkhazia will join Georgia while Saakashvili is at power.

It becomes obvious that Russia will stand on the state independence of these two republics after referenda are held there with predictable results. However the problems will come up later on, unlike in Kosovo, which has been recognized by the majority of the countries in the world and the key Western countries, regardless that this was in violation of the International law from the point of view of Russia, however its independence is a fact. The independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unlikely to be recognized by someone except Russia or Venezuela or Belarus. It would be a very complicated moment for Russia as it may find itself in a dangerous international isolation”.

Q: “The war in the Caucuses resurrected arguments related to the issue of whether the NATO countries did a right thing in the course of the April summit in Bucharest when refused Ukraine Georgia in their plans to join the NATO. Today some believe that if a reverse decision has been adopted, Russia would not dare to apply direct aggression and Saakashvili, as well, would think hard whether it would be worth to break into South Ossetia”.

A: “I strongly disagree with these arguments. I think Germany and France did a right thing when they took a break with regard to this issue. It is not true that Georgia and Ukraine are not welcomed into the NATO. They have been provided with an opportunity. However that would only happen after Georgia and Ukraine become real democracies and settle their relations with Russia, which is crucial for the NATO.

Semi-entrance of Georgia into the NATO which could have taken place in the course of the Bucharest Summit, would not stop Saakashvili in his intentions to return Ossetia via the use of force, which he is practicing these days. I know there are other arguments in Poland and in the Baltic states, that the NATO and the European Union should be turned into new mechanisms of restricting Russia. In case that would become a reality we will go back to the times we came out from in 1991.

The West should protect its own interests based on the experience the Europe gained in the past century. However times have changed. In the minds of Western elite ‘the cold war’ is over. There were conflicts with Russia however there were cheerful moments of strategic partnership. People can not imagine any more that there is a real danger, that it would be a must to protect the Western values and the Western material world against the Russian aggression.

Many Germans, while listening to Georgian or Ukrainian leaders are questioning themselves what they have in mind. Do they mean they need to protect democracy in those countries or do they demand for protection of the geopolitical interests of the USA in the region, which could not even be called ‘Europe’ in the sense of values or even in the geographical sense?

The NATO was founded in order to protect the Old Europe from the Soviet Union. Today we see how difficult it is for the NATO to defend its interests, let’s say in Afghanistan. The NATO may fail if it will not be capable to save the situation in Afghanistan. We have barely achieved some success in the Balkans. With all its desire to protect democracy, the West may simply lack enough resources or will power to do so”.

Q: “The war in Iraq provoked a serious split between the so-called ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe. Would it be right to say that something similar is happening today with regard to the war in the Caucuses? Whether the differences in the positions of the European countries relate only to tactics matters?”

A: “The split is even more profound than in 2003. Back then the enlargement that took place in 2004 was not yet the case. Today the Baltic countries and Poland became a part of the Western political institutions. The split in Europe related to the attitude towards Russia looks overwhelming. That is the key stone that breaks apart the common field for external and defense policy. Germany and France in the past 15 years came to terms with Russia and they remain faithful to the idea of strategic partnership. However this point of view is not supported by the elites of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries.

It is understandable, objectively thinking. However they are pushing the EU in a wrong direction compared with where it started moving after the ‘Cold War’. They still think they joined the NATO as it was in 1973. They look at the EU and the NATO as institutions meant to protect them from the ‘neo-imperialistic’ Russia. Germany and France do not have these biases. An opinion poll conducted on the first day of the today’s war, showed that 75% of Germans believed that Russia and Germany were in very good relations at the moment. They also considered the ‘fear of Russia’ that Poland and the Baltic states have, inappropriate or even hysterical.

Quite frequently the German elite talks today that if one indulges these ex-Warsaw Pact countries, they may turn Europe into their hostage in a very serious conflict with Russia which could lead to the Third World War”.

Q: “What would be the impact of the war in the Caucuses with regard to the Belarusian-Russian relations? How significant would you consider the fact that in the course of the first days of the conflict the authorities kept silent and squeezed out words of support to Russia only after a direct shout of Moscow?”

A: “Two years ago Lukashenko made a rather important strategic decision for himself, as he says: ‘to fly on both wings’, not a Russian wing solely. Indeed, so far his flight is not very balanced however one can feel that he is trying to engage in new partnership relations with the European Union. He succeeded in the business area. He is not willing to find himself in a situation when due to the single-sided support of the Russian policy Europe would completely reject him and he would depend on Russia only. He initiated a gradual privatization process and, strategically thinking, he needs strategic capital. Therefore he would stick to the neutral line in this conflict to the extent possible”.